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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRANCIS G. FORREST,

Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

8005

MARCELL GRAHAM,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as set forth in the brief of appellant are.
somewhat as stated. However, appellant's assertions (1)
that he remained in Salt Lake City from January of 1946
to January of 1947 (Tr. 19) ; and, (2) that he returned
to Utah in 1951 and remained for almost five months (Tr.
18); are merely unsupported statements as to the fact
which are, as to the issues, immaterial and of no moment.
Of materiality is the fact that appellant was released on
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bail in January of 1946 (Tr. 16, 20, 21); that appellant
had no subsequent contact with his bondsman (Tr. 21);
and that appellant knew the bond was forfeited (Tr. 21);
all of which is indicative of the fact that appellant at no
time demanded trial nor presented himself for trial. It is
a material fact, not included in appellant's Statement of
Facts, that the only attempt made to show bias or prejudice is as to that of the district attorney (Tr. 23) ; there
was no proof adduced as to either bias or prejudice to appellant on the part of any jurist conducting the various
trials and· hearings in this matter. Further, the mere assertion in the complaint to the effect
"that the * * * sentence is illegal because imposed by a judge who had divested himself of jurisdiction," (Tr. 11)
and the statement of appellant made at the hearing that
Judge Keller disqualified himself (Tr. 19) are not "Statements of Fact;" the first is a mere conclusion in the pleadings, the second an opinion· of the witness.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A PUBLIC AND SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED
BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
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POINT II
THE HONORABLE F. W. KELLER, DISTRICT
JUDGE FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, WAS NEVER DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION IN THE
MATTER; AND, HE HAVING RECEIVED THE
VERDICT AND IMPOSED SENTENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE DID
NOT CONDUCT THE TRIAL NOR HEAR THE
EVIDENCE, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS NOT JURISDICTIONAL SO AS TO BE OPEN TO IMPEACHMENT COLLATERALLY, i.e., BY HABEAS CORPUS. THE COURT BELOW, BY SO
HOLDING, DID NOT ERR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A PUBLIC AND SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED
BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Brief of appellant would indicate that this point, first
raised in his original complaint and presented to the lower
court, has been by him abandoned. Respondent raises the
point now only for the purpose of disposing of the question
should this Honorable Court feel constrained to entertain
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this phase of the pleadings. Our court has heretofore ruled
on the issue. In the case of State v. Bohn, 67 Utah 362, 248
P. 119, the court said:

"* * * A defendant in a criminal action
may waive his right to a speedy trial. He cannot remain inactive and afterwards complain that he has
not been given a speedy trial and interpose that as
a defense."
In the case of Pietch v. U. S., (1940) 110 F. 2d 819, that
court said:
"The contention is made that it was prejudicial
to the rights of appellant to be tried more than
seven years after the termination of the transactions on which the indictment was predicated. The
indictment was returned before limitation had run.
The United States Attorney stated in person and
by letter to counsel for some of the accused that he
did not intend to try the case, and that it was his
purpose to dismiss it. But appellant never made
demand for trial. He did not object or protest to
the court respecting the delay. He filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment on account of the delay,
but the motion was filed more than three years
after the return of the indictment, and it was a
motion to dismiss-not a demand for trial. A person charged with a crime cannot assert with success
that his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States has been invaded unless he asked for a trial.
In the absence of an affirmative request or demand
for trial made to the court it must be presumed that
appellant acquiesced in the delay and therefore cannot complain." (and cases there cited.)
See also State v. Schnell, (Mont. 1939) 88 P. 2d 19, 121
A. L. R. 1082; also 14 Am. Jur. 863, Sec. 138. At no time,
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prior to his apprehension on April 8th, 1952, did appellant
present himself for trial nor request that he be tried.

POINT II
THE HONORABLE F. W. KELLER, DISTRICT
JUDGE FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, WAS NEVER DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION IN THE
MATTER; AND, HE HAVING RECEIVED THE·
VERDICT AND IMPOSED SENTENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE DID
NOT CONDUCT THE TRIAL NOR HEAR THE
EVIDENCE, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS NOT JURISDICTIONAL SO AS TO BE OPEN TO IMPEACHMENT COLLATERALLY, i.e., BY HABEAS CORPUS. THE COURT BELOW, BY SO
HOLDING, DID NOT ERR.
Respondent replies to Point I and Point II of appellant's brief in this Point II of respondent's brief since the
questions are so interrelated that they can best be simultaneously dealt with.
The appellant contends that the Honorable Fred W.
Keller divested himself of jurisdiction in this case by either:
( 1)

Disqualification on motion or affidavit of defen-

(2)

Voluntary disqualification due to bias or preju-

dant.

dice.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
( 3)

By calling in another judge to conduct the trial.

Respondent does not find in the record neither motion
nor affidavit directed to the qualifications of the Honorable
Judge Keller to have heard this matter; there was no application for change of judge made as provided for under
Sections 77-25-2, 77-25-3, U. C. A. 1953, nor for disqualification under.Rule 63 (b) U. R. C. P. Nor can respondent
find anything in said record (beyond an allegation on information and belief in the amended complaint in the present action) alleging, claiming, declaring or contending'that
there existed anything in the mental attitude or disposition of the Honorable Judge Keller such as would imply
"bias" or "prejudice" to this appellant. It is respectfully
suggested that these issues are, therefore, not properly now
before this court, nor timely raised.
As to the third contention : This we admit, Judge
Keller did call in another judge, the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
to conduct the trial of the case, and, Judge Keller did thereafter in said matter receive the verdict and impose the
. sentence. These facts raise the sole question, "If such be
error, does it make for want of jurisdiction so as to rendl)r
the judgment void, and being void, subject to collateral
attack?" Respondent thinks not.
According to the weight of authority, at common law,
the acts of a disqualified judge are not mere nullities; they
are simply erroneous and liable to be avoided or reversed
on proper application, but cannot be impeached collaterally,
except in the case of those inferior tribunals from which
no appeal or writ of error lies. This is also the general
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rule under statutes, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary or expressly prohibiting the judge from
sitting, especially where the disqualification is regarded as
a matter of personal privilege merely. (30 Am. Jur., Judges,
Sec. 97, page 802.) By stating this rule respondent does
not admit nor in any manner concede that Judge Keller
was at any time in fact disqualified to act in this matter.
We merely propose the principle that in any event his act
was not a nullity but was at most erroneous and being only
error not subject to attack by habeas corpus.
"Where the court has jurisdiction by Iaw of the
offense charged and of the party who is so charged,'
its judgments are not, as a general rule, nullities
which can be appealed collaterally as a basis for
release by habeas corpus."

Re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 41 L. Ed. 1085.
The primary and ordinarily the only question involved
in habeas corpus proceedings is one of jurisdiction-namely,
whether the particular order, judgment or process whose
validity is attacked is one coming within the lawful authority of the court or officer making or issuing it. It is well
settled that no court may properly release a prisoner held
under warrant, conviction or sentence of another court
unless for want of jurisdiction or some other matter rendering its proceedings void. (See 25 Am. Jur., Habeas
Corpus, Sec. 26.) Further, where the aid of a writ of habeas
corpus is sought to secure the discharge of one who is restrained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment, the proceeding is a collateral assault upon judgments. It follows
that the writ lies where the judgment attacked is absolutely
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void, and only where this is the case. (See 25 Am. Jur.,
Habeas Corpus, Sec. 55.)
Considering a similar, if not identical, situation as the
issue here involves, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case of U. S. v. V alante, 264 U. S. 563, 68 L. Ed.
850, 44 S. C. 411, said:
"Habeas corpus will not lie for the release of a prisoner because * * * the verdict was received by
a judge other than the one who presided at the trial
* * * the error' if any was committed, would
not go to the jurisdiction of the court or render the
judgment void but was at the most one which could
have been corrected upon review by writ of error.
It is the well established general rule that a writ of
habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of
proceedings in error."
r

In Commonwealth v. Thompson, ( 1937) 195 Atl. 115, also
cited by appellant, wherein that court held that the substitution of judges during the impaneling of the jury was not
error, that court said:
"The general rule prohibits entirely the substitution
of a judge during the course of a criminal trial after
a jury has been sworn and prior to a verdict." (Emphasis added.) Citing Freeman vs. U. S., 227 F.
732.
The court went on to state :
"At other stages of trial, a different rule exists. As
to receipt of the verdict, some courts have taken the
view that the function must be performed by the
judge who presided at the trial. In Hinman v. People,
13 Hun. (N. Y.) 266, three judges presided at a
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trial for grand larceny, and only one judge was on
the bench when the verdict was received ; this was
held to be reversible error. In England, under the
common law, no judgment could be entered or execution ordered except by the judge who tried the
case, but this rule has been changed by statute. In
this state, since the receipt of the verdict is merely
a routine matter and not the judgment of the court,
another judge may receive the verdict as recorded,
unless upon its receipt a motion or other matter
develops which requires a personal knowledge of the
case, in which event the trial judge should be present."

The writ of habeas corpus was not at issue in this case ;
the appeal alleged error. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy only and cannot be employed as an appellate remedy.
(Bean v. State, 58 Idaho 797, 79 P. 2d 540.) See also, In
Re Bates, (Idaho 1942) 125 P. 2d 1017; and generally
.. Habeas Corpus, key 105.

*

*

*

*

*

Appellant's Point III presupposes first, his success in
this appeal to the extent that the Honorable Judge F. W.
Keller was without jurisdiction and that the sentence by
· him imposed was void; second, that when and if this court
grants the writ of habeas corpus, the State will deliver the
appellant before the Honorable Judge A. H. Ellett for resentencing. Respondent resists this Point III and appellant's second supposition at this time on the ground that
a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ in anticipation of
~: error; appellant cannot anticipate the regular course of
v
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proceedings by alleging a want of jurisdiction and demanding a ruling thereon in habeas corpus proceedings.

Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420; In Re Gregory, 219
U.S. 210; Ex parte Simon, 208 U.S. 144; Johnson v. Hoy,
227 U. S. 245; Urquart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179; Hyde v.
Shine, 199 U. S. 62; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 59 L.
Ed. 203, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Rumely v. McCarthy, 250
U. S. 283, 63 L. Ed. 983, 39 Sup. Ct. 483.
This court has said :
"In habeas corpus proceedings nothing is inquired
into except the legality of the restraint, * * *"
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent concludes that appellant has placed himself
in such position as to preclude him from raising an objec. tion to the delay of his trial or trials; that appellant has
, .' :•; adduced no proof as to show the Honorable F. W. Keller
· · · disqualified in this matter either by motion made or affidavit filed, nor has appellant in any way shown or attempted to show that there existed anything in the mental
attitude or disposition of the said Judge Keller as would
imply either "bias" or "prejudice" towards appellant.
Finally, .respondent further concludes that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to employ to attack the sub.stitution of judges which took place only after the trial was
concluded and at the time the jury returned its verdict. The
error, if any was committed, did not go to the jurisdiction of
the court or render the judgment void. Respondent contends
that the order of the court below should and must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General, .
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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